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It\u2019s been this way since the mid-1980s, when a Yale-based academic and pollster named Stanley Greenberg turned his attention from studying the interplay of class and race in apartheid South Africa to try and explain what was happening in Macomb. In 1960, it was the most heavily Democratic suburban county in the United States. By 1984, it was landslide territory for Ronald Reagan. The population was overwhelmingly white and thoroughly middle class, largely living in tract homes and driving their cars to industrial jobs throughout metro Detroit. They were, by all appearances, Democrats. But they weren\u2019t voting like it. Why not? <\/p>\n
After convening a series of focus groups, Greenberg coined a term for these voters \u2014 \u201cReagan Democrats\u201d \u2014 and a theory of the case. In these voters\u2019 eyes, \u201cthe leaders who were supposed to fight for them seemed to care more about the blacks in Detroit and the protesters on campus; they seemed to care more about equal rights and abortion than about mortgage payments and crime,\u201d Greenberg later wrote. \u201cThe old politics has failed them. What they really want is a new political contract \u2014 and the freedom to dream the American dream again.\u201d Macomb, he said, \u201cis the site of an historic upheaval that has wrecked the old and promises a new volatile kind of politics.\u201d<\/p>\n
For four decades now, that historic upheaval and the quest for the support of \u201cReagan Democrats\u201d has defined American politics, from the rise of Bill Clinton\u2019s \u201cNew Democrats\u201d \u2014 which Greenberg, as Clinton\u2019s pollster, had a central role in crafting \u2014 to George W. Bush\u2019s \u201ccompassionate conservatism,\u201d to Barack Obama\u2019s poll-tested evisceration of Mitt Romney\u2019s venture capital experience, to Donald Trump\u2019s white-grievance mongering and tirades against NAFTA. After Obama won Macomb in 2008 and 2012, Trump captured it in both 2016 and 2020.<\/p>\n
Then something important happened: In leaning too hard into white identity politics \u2014 and perhaps being too focused on what he thought Reagan Democrats wanted \u2014 Trump accelerated the rise of a new voting bloc that is, in many ways, the mirror image of the Reagan Democrats. <\/p>\n
Call them the Biden Republicans.<\/p>\n
Like the Reagan Democrats, they\u2019re heavily white and live in suburbs. But where the Reagan Dems are blue-collar and culturally conservative, Greenberg sees the Biden Republicans as more affluent, highly educated and supportive of diversity. Historically, they identified with the Republican Party as their political home. But the leaders who were supposed to fight for them seem to care more about white grievance and keeping out immigrants; seem to care more about social issues and \u201cowning the libs\u201d than about childcare payments and college tuition. They don\u2019t consider themselves Democrats \u2014 at least not yet \u2014 but they are voting for them, delivering them majorities in the House and Senate, and making Joe Biden just the fourth candidate in the last century to defeat an incumbent president.<\/p>\n
Now, with the support of Biden Republicans shored up \u2014 at least for the time being \u2014 Joe Biden is embarking on an audacious gambit that\u2019s gone largely unnoticed, but, if successful, could kneecap national Republicans for a decade: Recapturing the support of the Reagan Democrats.<\/p>\n
\u201cBiden is very self-consciously campaigning for Macomb County-type, white working-class voters [for whom] race is not the only thing driving their vote, but who went to Trump [in 2016] because of globalization and their belief that Democrats are not fighting for American workers,\u201d says Greenberg, now based in Washington, D.C., where he continues to work in political polling. \u201c\u2018America First\u2019 rhetoric was a part of Biden\u2019s campaign. It\u2019s still part of \u2018build back better.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n
And that puts Republicans in a strategically difficult position. <\/p>\n
\u201cYou have this battle kind of in the mainstream between \u2018Reagan Democrats\u2019 \u2014 who voted for Reagan, came back to vote for Bill Clinton, some voted for Obama \u2014 and a whole new set of voters brought in by Trump,\u201d says Greenberg.<\/p>\n
In both 2016 and 2020, Trump brought in new voters \u2014 people animated by \u201cwhite nationalism and racial resentment, and whose overwhelming motivation is a deep worry that Black people and immigrants will control the country,\u201d and who are \u201cvoting straight-ticket [Republican] to \u2018save the country,\u2019\u201d says Greenberg. But by courting those votes, Republicans risk pushing the Biden Republicans further into the Democratic ledger.<\/p>\n
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Another option, of course, is to try and keep these new Trump voters active \u2014 which could be a major political gamble, especially when Trump isn\u2019t on the ballot \u2014 and try to run up margins with the Reagan Democrats. One big problem with that: Joe Biden. <\/p>\n
Biden lacks the cosmopolitan appeal of Obama, but to Reagan Democrats, that\u2019s a feature not a bug. \u201cObama was pro-globalization, and believed we benefited from it,\u201d says Greenberg. \u201cHe would have been embarrassed to go see a company that was bringing jobs back from abroad to build in America. He would have been embarrassed to highlight that. But Biden will.\u201d It\u2019s Trump\u2019s economic populism without Trump\u2019s dog-sees-a-squirrel message discipline.<\/p>\n
\u201cTrump voters, a large portion of them, want a welfare state that is dependable for working people,\u201d says Greenberg. And Biden\u2019s proposed $1.9 trillion Covid relief package could make a tangible difference in their lives. Do the Reagan Democrats stick with non-Trump Republicans if Biden\u2019s Democrats deliver reopened schools, a strong economy, a huge investment in infrastructure and a $3,600-per-child benefit to families on top of a $1,400 stimulus check?<\/p>\n
For Republicans, Greenberg sees a reality not unlike the one Democrats faced when he first decamped to Macomb County: \u201cThey are going to have to lose a few elections before there can be a new dynamic within the Republican Party \u2014 just as the Democrats lost a lot of national elections before Bill Clinton was able to change the party.\u201d<\/p>\n
How exactly might this all play out? To sort through it, Politico Magazine<\/span> spoke with Greenberg this week. A condensed transcript of that conversation follows, edited for length and clarity.<\/p>\n One of the key insights of your work identifying the \u201cReagan Democrats\u201d was that these white, blue-collar suburbanites who were traditionally Democrats saw the party as increasingly detached from their political concerns \u2014 and instead aligned with people of color, academics and cultural \u201celites.\u201d Was Donald Trump the endpoint of that shift? It\u2019s hard to imagine a purer distillation of many of those components. <\/b><\/p>\n You know, I\u2019m not sure we understand all of the dynamics in American politics right now. You have this battle kind of in the mainstream between \u201cReagan Democrats\u201d \u2014 who voted for Reagan, came back to vote for Bill Clinton, some voted for Obama \u2014 and a whole new set of voters brought in by Trump. And I don\u2019t know how it\u2019s going to play out.<\/p>\n First, there\u2019s one [level of this discussion that\u2019s] about persuasion. If you look at the \u201cReagan Democrats,\u201d they were dealing with their unions. They were part of establishment networks \u2014 you know, they would reject it in particular elections, but in most elections, they were aligned with what the big unions were doing. And Democrats were winning downballot, despite their problems at the presidential level. <\/p>\n Then, overlaying the persuasion battle is this engagement and mobilization component. Trump came to lead a kind of Tea Party, anti-government revolt against \u201celites.\u201d It really began in a revolt against Obama and the idea an African-American president and his coalition were going to govern forever as demographic trends accelerated and we became a younger, more diverse, more immigrant nation. Trump challenged that [assumption] and produced huge turnout [in 2016] by people who had not voted before.<\/p>\n But that kind of reversed in a series of historic elections. The 2018 midterms had the highest turnout in the history of midterms, brought out more college-educated voters \u2014 suburban college-educated voters, not so much white working-class voters \u2014 and Democrats had a good year. And then the election of 2020 had virtually the highest turnout since William McKinley and the Populist Era \u2014 just a huge<\/i> increase. <\/p>\n Trump brought in all kinds of new voters in 2016. And I didn\u2019t realize that he could do it again in 2020. In the voter-eligible population, there was like a 1-point decline in the percentage of white non-college voters between 2016 and 2020. Yet Trump increased turnout \u2014 their share of the electorate \u2014 by 7 points. That was done by bringing in new voters. <\/p>\n The difference is [Trump\u2019s] new voters are voting to \u201csave the country\u201d and solve the \u201cdemographic problem,\u201d and they are voting straight ticket. Everybody else is kind of in between, [voting for some Democrats and some Republicans]. But they<\/i> are voting to \u201csave the country\u201d from being this diverse place that has tolerant values and is open to immigration. And they\u2019re voting for every Republican and against every Democrat, top to bottom.<\/p>\n We\u2019ve seen these big suburban shifts towards Democrats over the last few elections, but there are lingering questions about how long-lasting that shift is. What\u2019s your read: Are Democrats \u201crenting\u201d these suburban voters, or \u201cbuying\u201d them? <\/b><\/p>\n The shift of college-educated voters toward Democrats has been going on from the election of Bill Clinton in 1992, up through Gore in 2000 and beyond. I had a fight with Rahm Emanuel when he was heading the DCCC: James Carville and I were arguing that the congressional district lines had been drawn with the standard assumption that college-educated and wealthier voters were strong Republicans, but that in fact, that demographic had flipped, and if you went a little bit further than just the races with the most resources being spent, there were many more competitive seats than people realized. We won control of the House in 2006. And we gained seats in 2008 \u2014 which surprised people. But that was because of this trend.<\/p>\n Nothing has changed that; that trend will continue. Millennials and Gen Z have a much higher proportion of college [educational attainment], and they\u2019re increasing their share of the electorate. The values of those voters continue to be aligned with Democrats \u2014 though I actually think they are more likely to be ticket-splitters. <\/p>\n If you look at the midterms versus what happened in 2020, [Democrats] had a drop-off in support with them, but I think they were acting normally \u2014 whereas Trump\u2019s new white working-class and rural voters were not. Many of them are new to the electorate and voting with a different kind of energy \u2014 voting straight-ticket to \u201csave the country.\u201d Anything short of that [level of support] is going to look like Democrats are just \u201crenting\u201d those suburban voters. But the Democrats\u2019 new voters were being normal people who don\u2019t vote 100 percent [party line].<\/p>\n So, you see that trend continuing? We\u2019re not yet at the highwater mark for the \u201cdiploma divide?\u201d <\/b><\/p>\n I do, at least with those people who are normal voters \u2014 that is, who are kind of in and out of elections. But on the white working-class and rural side, what happened in both \u201916 and \u201920 was this [surge of] new voters who hadn\u2019t voted before. So I have no idea what\u2019s going to happen in the midterms. I can see one scenario where, with the Democrats in control, those voters are motivated even more to turn out in huge numbers to \u201csave the country.\u201d Or they could drop off as they did in 2018 or maybe even like they did in [the Senate runoff elections in] Georgia, where Trump was not on the ballot. Are these voters anti-Democratic Party? Will they reward what looks like it might be a successful Democratic administration in the midterms \u2014 which we haven\u2019t had for a while? I have no idea.<\/p>\n You\u2019ve mentioned this sense, among certain Trump voters, of needing to \u201csave the country.\u201d Describe that. What animates that existential concern? Is it purely about race? Is it something else? <\/b><\/p>\n Yeah, racial resentment is a very strong piece. I think we underestimate how powerful a moment it was when Barack Obama won and then got reelected. To this coalition, they view \u201cObamacare\u201d as simply paying off his base of voters with big government payoffs to ensure a permanent Democratic majority. <\/p>\n I think Obama campaigning in every election has given them the rationale that they have<\/i> to vote. It\u2019s why Trump made reversing Obama\u2019s legacy \u2014 reversing everything Obama did \u2014 feature centrally in his rallies: Obama represented a whole changed America that they had to stop.<\/p>\n That actually sounds a lot like an aspect of the \u201cReagan Democrat\u201d dynamic you identified in Macomb County, Michigan, in the \u201980s and \u201990s. You wrote about those focus groups in 1995\u2019s Middle-Class Dreams: <\/i>These white voters \u201cexpressed a profound distaste for Black Americans, a sentiment that pervaded almost everything they thought about government and politics. Blacks constitute the explanation for their vulnerability and for almost everything that had gone wrong in their lives; not being black was what constituted being middle class.\u201d Is that the same dynamic at play now, decades later? <\/b><\/p>\n No. There\u2019s a step in this history: In the end, these \u201cReagan Democrats\u201d voted for Obama. It was competitive in \u201908 and \u201912, but when you listened to these voters, they decided Barack Obama was not Jesse Jackson: He was not a candidate they saw as running to represent \u201chis people.\u201d They thought he would fight for all Americans, and they ultimately voted for him \u2014 which is pretty astonishing. What they were most concerned about was NAFTA, corporations sending jobs to Mexico, CEOs enriching themselves and not investing in their own companies. They were incredibly focused on globalization. They were on the front lines of people angry about what was happening with corporate America, and were voting for Democrats \u2014 and for Obama, specifically \u2014 because they thought he would take up those issues.<\/p>\n That competed with this racial dynamic. Obama benefited from it. But Trump benefited from it, too, because he ran on reversing all these trade agreements, and Democrats were pansies on talking about trade in 2016. Hillary Clinton was really for<\/i> [the Trans-Pacific Partnership], and Trump was authentically campaigning against<\/i> NAFTA, against TPP and was depicted as \u201cfighting for working people,\u201d which Democrats hadn\u2019t done for a long time. Trade was key to that. It was a key part of why he was winning these voters \u2014 not just because of race, but because \u201cAmerica First\u201d represented fighting for American industry and American manufacturing, and Democrats were about \u201cglobalization\u201d and trade and were actually embarrassed to attack some companies for moving jobs to Mexico. <\/p>\n That changed with Biden, by the way. Biden, when he came out of the basement \u2014 as Trump described it \u2014 he very self-consciously went right to these states first, and said, \u201cI hear you. I\u2019m listening. I\u2019m not of that<\/i> school.\u201d He didn\u2019t say the word \u201cdeplorable;\u201d he said, \u201cI\u2019m listening to you.\u201d And when you look at his economic plan, a lot of it was about \u201cAmerica First.\u201d It was about building in America. It was about stopping outsourcing. \u201cAmerica First\u201d rhetoric was a part of Biden\u2019s campaign. It\u2019s still part of \u201cbuild back better.\u201d<\/p>\n![\"Stanley](\"https:\/\/static.politico.com\/9e\/41\/67adba68477586247071187963cd\/gettyimages-534930412.jpg\")
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